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LEGAL ISSUES CONFRONTING THE
EXPLOITATION OF RENEWABLE SOURCES
OF ENERGY FROM THE OCEANS*
STEPHEN L. JOSEPH**
Editor's Note.- Mr. Joseph was commissioned by the United Nations Conference on New & Renewable Sources of Energy (L'NERG) to prepare this report. It is
being used as an internal workingpaper in preparation/or the UNERG Conference to
be held in Nairobi Kenya in August, 1981. It is based on the best available legal
information as of June, 1980, however, by the date of the Nairobi Conference significant changes could occur. The JOURNAL feels that this report is an invaluable addition
to the international legal literature examining the exploitation of renewable ocean energy sources. As such, wepublish it in primarily the form in which it was submitted to
the United Nations. As a result, it contains a minimal number offootnotes as there
was a great need to make the report readable to the non-lawyer.

With the shift in global energy resource usage from primarily
oil to alternatives, some envisage the oceans as being a possible
contributor. Apart from oil and natural gas, the thermal gradient,
waves, currents, tides, salinity gradient, biomass, offshore winds
and the geothermal resource can all be converted into useful forms
of energy. Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion (OTEC) t appears to
** Attorney, Nossaman, Krueger & Marsh, Washington, D.C. and Los Angeles, Ca.;
L.L.M., International Law, 1979 University of Virginia; B.A. (Honors) Law, 1977 Polytechnic of the South Bank, London, England.
I. OTEC uses the temperature differential between warm surface waters and colder,
deep waters of the ocean to produce electricity. Two simple OTEC processes exist to extract
energy from the ocean. Both utilize solar energy that has been colected and stored as heat in
the surface layer of the ocean. The first process is known as the "closed cycle." Here, a
working fluid, such as ammonia, propane or a freon-type refrigerant is vaporized and recondensed continuously in a closed loop to drive a turbine. Warm sea water is drawn from the
ocean surface and pumped through heat exchangers wherein the secondary working fluid is
vaporized. The working fluid then expands and emerges as a high pressure vapor to drive
the turbine. From the turbine exhaust vapor flows to a condenser where it returns to a liquid
as it is cooled by cold sea water. The second method is known as the "open cycle." Warm
surface water is evaporated under a partial vacuum. The steam thus produced passes
through and propels a turbine, and is later cooled in a condenser using cold sea water
pumped up from the depths.
OTEC electricity can be cabled to shore by transmission cable. Alternatively, OTEC
plantships can traverse ("graze") the oceans in order to find the maximum thermal gradient
differentials. In the latter mode of deployment, the energy produced could be used for energy-incensive manufacturing processes on board such as the production of ammonia or aluminum, or the processing of manganese nodules.
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be the technology which will be the most significant 2 in this century. Research and development in France, Japan and the United
States has advanced the technology to a stage which could see commercial OTECs deployed before 1990.
The industries developing OTEC face a number of legal, institutional and financial uncertainties. Despite the government's apparent emphasis on nuclear energy, coal and synthetic fuels,
program managers in the United States are having to convince corporate management that commitment to OTEC research, development and demonstration programs should continue by
demonstrating that these uncertainties are quickly being resolved.
It cannot be overemphasized that in the United States at least, the
early years of the 1980's are a critical period of decision for the
OTEC community. There is little strong corporate commitment to
OTEC,3 and uncertainties make the cases of the OTEC program
managers weaker. When a corporation decides to commit vast
amounts of capital into capital intensive technologies like OTEC, it
requires long lead-times for decision making. Uncertainties which
now exist, affect the actualities of many years hence.4
The purpose of this paper is to address the major international
law issues confronting the development of renewable ocean energy.
National law studies require treatment in separate papers,5 but
should not be underestimated. In the United States there has been
some difficulty convincing the Administration and Congress of the
need for the enactment of a comprehensive legal regime and licens2. It will probably produce the most renewable ocean resource derived energy by the
year 2000.
3. This is in large part based on U.S. industry's view that the Department of Energy's
OTEC program is underambitious and overcautious. The general feeling is that the program
is out of step with the advanced state of technology. This is felt to be more a problem of
commitment than of disagreement. See, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Energy Development and Applications, US. House of Representatives Committee on Science and Technology, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. - (June 5, 1980) (statements of Stephen L. Joseph).
4. See the testimony of the Ocean Energy Council before the National Ocean Policy
Study Group, U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, U.S. Congress, May 1, 1980 -[T]he justification of large, new investment requires considerable internal lead times to accomodate the corporate and financial decision-making process. The
preparation of thoughtful long-range plans, the in-house promotion of new technology, the
development of financing, and the resolution of institutional deficiencies all require extended
periods of time. To prepare an internal schedule of technology introduction, many institutional and financial questions must be resolved well in advance of their actual materialization. Moreover, a decision to finance an OTEC plant must be made several years before the
actual commitment of funds" (p.5).
5. However, a review of pending U.S. legislation is included in Appendix A.
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ing legislation.6 Such legislation is needed now, not in five or more
years when it will be utilized. Industry needs advance information
on what kind of legal regime will prevail. Without this guidance
they may decide to commit capital to more certain investment climates.
The international law of the sea is going through a period of
major change. The Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea,
negotiated in 1958 at the United Nations Conference on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS I), are now recognized as inadequate for the
needs of the 1980s. The emergence in 1967 of the notion that the
deep seabed should be vested in mankind as a whole, 7 the perception that the Geneva regime was not comprehensive enough, and
the development of new offshore technologies resulted in preparations for a Third Conference. 8 However, thirteen years of planning
and negotiation still have not produced a document for signature.
Meanwhile, States have been developing the law by unilateral extensions of their jurisdictions. Presently, many of the rules of customary international law of the sea are uncertain and highly
controversial. However, it is unlikely that there will be more than a
handful of deployments of ocean energy devices beyond territorial
waters in the next few years, so there is little utility in ascertaining
the present customary position.
In this paper, for the sake of brevity and readable analysis, the
references for determining the law of the sea are the four Geneva
Conventions9 and the latest draft negotiating text of the Third
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III),
the Informal Composite Negotiating Text Revision 2 (ICNT). l°
The Geneva Conventions bind less than a majority of States," but
as they generally codified existing customary principles, and in the
case of some provisions may bind nonsignatories, they represent a
6. See note 4 supra. The rest of that testimony addressed this issue.
7. See G.A. Res. 2340 (XXII), Dec. 18, 1967; G.A. Res. 2467 (XXIII) Dec. 21, 1968;
G.A. Res. 2574 (XXIV), Dec. 15, 1969; G.A. Res. 2749 (XXV), Dec. 17, 1970; G.A. Res. 2881
(XXVI), Dec. 21, 1971.
8. The Second Conference was held in 1960 to discuss the territorial sea limit, but
produced no agreement. The inaugural session of the Third Conference convened in New
York in 1973. The conference recently completed the first phase of its ninth session.
9. The citations for the three Conventions of relevance to this paper are contained in
notes 16 and 19 infra.
10. Informal Composite Negotiating Text/Revision 2 (ICNT), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.
62/WP. 10/Rev. 2 April 11, 1980 [hereinafter referred to as ICNT], reprintedin 18 INT'L
LEGAL MATS. 686 (1979).
11. See notes 16 and 19 infra.
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good starting point for a general analysis. The trends in State
practice generally reflect ICNT provisions. The "common heritage
of mankind" concept may already be part of international law.' 2
Twelve-mile territorial seas and twenty-four mile continguous
zones are also so prevalent in State practice that they are probably
part of customary international law, 3 especially as they are consistent with the ICNT.' 4 Resource zones of 200 miles
almost certainly
5
are now part of customary international law.'
To the maximum extent possible, this paper has been written
in such a way as to make it comprehensible to nonlawyers. However, an introduction to some legal concepts is necessary to assist
the layman. It is widely understood that each State has its own
national legal system. However, on the international plane there
exists a body of law called public international law. This sytem
regulates State-to-State relations and rarely deals directly with nonState entities. Although it is binding, there is no comprehensive
systematized enforcement scheme. The occasional violation does
not refute the existence of this body of law. It is still observed most
of the time, except in critical war and peace issues.
International law and the national legal systems exist side by
side. In most cases, they are mutually exclusive, regulating different subject matters. Where they intersect and conflict, international
legal doctrine maintains that international law prevails. However,
in national courts judges follow the decisions of their governments
embodied in a constitution or legislation, which may give primacy
to national law. In the United States, for example, the two main
sources of international legal rules, treaties (also called conventions) and binding customs have the status of Federal law. Subsequent national legislation has primacy over both sources and all
national legislation has primacy over customery international law.
When a State is referred to as having authority or jurisdiction,
it has authority to prescribe and enforce its laws over a particular
subject matter, object or person. Unless international agreements
or custom are contrary, this power is exclusively vested in one State
12. See G.A. Res. 2749 (XXV), Dec. 17, 1970. Resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly are not binding upon States. If the new deep seabed concepts are part of
international law, it is because the history of State practice since 1967 or 1970 supports the
conclusion that they are now customary principles. The United States maintains that they
are not part of international law.
13. The United States has retained a three nautical mile limit.
14. ICNT, supra note 10, arts. 3 and 33(2).
15. States have established general resource zones of this breadth. Cf. note 69 infra.
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under international law.1 6 .
The conclusion is written
Nations Conference on New
(UNERG). It is designed to
report without extensive legal
I.

as a summary report for the United
and Renewable Sources of Energy
summarize the points made in this
analysis.

SITING AND RESOURCE EXPLOITATION

The most basic concerns in the development of ocean energy
devices is in which areas of ocean space and under what conditions
may a device be sited and operated.
A.

The Geneva Convention Concepts

UNCLOS I convened at Geneva in 1958 and produced four
documents for signature and ratification. The three that are of relevant to this paper are the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the
Contiguous Zone; 7 the Convention on the Continental Shelf; 18 and
the Convention on the High Seas. 19

1. Internal Waters. The Convention on the Territorial Sea
and the Contiguous Zone provides that waters on the landward
side of the baseline from which the territorial sea is measured together with their mouths, form part of the "internal waters" of a
State.2" They include ports, bays, lakes and rivers and sometimes
other water areas closely adjacent to the land. A State has sovereignty over such waters extending to the air space over them, as
well as to the bed and subsoil below.2 ' Since this sovereignty is
subject only to the duty not to hamper very limited rights of innocent passage, the customary law rules of entry in distress,22 and
16. With respect to all the ocean zones mentioned in this paper, there are special rules
for delimiting their boundaries between the neighboring or adjacent States. The following
rules are general and are applicable to States with no adjacent or neighboring States. Often
States are so positioned that they cannot extend their jurisdictions beyond a limited distance
because of another State's jurisdiction or land territory. See Convention on the Territorial
Sea and the Contiguous Zone, arts. 12 and 24(3) (hereinafter referred to as Territorial Sea
Cony.) done Apr. 29, 1958, 516 U.N.T.S. 205, 15 U.S.T. 1606, art. 6; Convention on the
Continental Shelf art. 6, (hereinafter referred to as CS Cony.) done April 29, 1958, 499
U.N.T.S. 311, 15 U.S.T. 471; ICNT, supra note 10, arts. 15, 74 and 83.
17. Id.
18. Id.,
19. Convention on the High Seas (hearinafter referred to as High Seas Conv.), done
Apr. 29, 1958, 450 U.N.T.S. 82, 13 U.S.T. 2312.
20. Territorial Sea Conv., supra note 16, art. 5(1).
21. Id., arts. I and 2.
22. See the Hoff Case, United States Y. Mexico, U.N.R.I.A.A. 444; Convention on the
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laws regulating the marine environment, a State has a high degree
of authority to site ocean energy devices in these waters. 23 It can
grant site exclusivity to OTEC and other ocean energy devices so
that the thermal or other resource is utilized to the optimum.
There are no rights of passage for foreign ships in internal waters, except where the establishment of a straight baseline has the
effect of enclosing, as internal waters, an area which previously had
been considered territorial or high seas. In such waters, foreign
vessels have a right of innocent passage, as they do in the territorial
sea. 2 Where there is a right of innocent passage in internal waters,
there is a duty not to hamper this navigation. 5
The baseline for measuring the territorial sea is normally
drawn at the low-water line along the coast. 6 However, special
circumstances may permit the drawing of baselines in other ways
resulting in significant variations. For example, where the coastline
is "deeply indented and cut into," or where there is "a fringe of
islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity," straight baselines
may be drawn.27 Such baselines must not depart to any appreciable extent from the general direction of the coast. 28 The sea areas
lying within the lines must be sufficiently linked to the land domain
to be subject to the regime of internal waters. 29 Additionally, in
determining particular baselines account may be taken of "ecoand
nomic interests peculiar to the region concerned, the reality
'
importance of which are clearly evidenced by long usage. 30
The Convention also permits the drawing of closing lines
across or inside certain bays. 3' The waters on the landward side of
these bays constitute internal waters. With respect to rivers flowing
directly into the sea, the baseline may be a straight line across the
mouth of the river between two points on the low-tide line of its
Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships, art. 17, done May 25, 1962, at Brussels; as cited in I
S. ODA,INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE OCEAN DEVELOPMENT 459 (1972).

23. See text accompanying notes 104-112 infra. The word "devices" refers to all manmade artificial islands and vessels or other manmade structures. In this article, biomass
farms are included within this term.
24. Territorial Sea Conv., supra note 16, art. 5(2).
25. Id., art. 15(1).
26. Id., art. 3.
27. Id.. art. 4(l).
28. Id., art. 4(2).
29. Id.
30. Id., art. 4(4).
31. Id., art. 7.
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banks.3 2 Other provisions of the Convention deal with ports, 33
roadsteads34 and low-tide elevations, 35 but, for the purposes of this
report, they do not warrant discussion.
The ICNT adds new circumstances under which straight baselines may be drawn. Where the coastline is highly unstable due to
the presence of a delta and other natural conditions, the straight
baseline may be drawn to points along the farthest seaward extent
of the low-water line. 36 There would be no other significant
changes to the regime of internal waters.3 7
2. The TerritorialSea. The Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone states that the sovereignty of a
State extends, beyond its land territory and internal waters, over a
belt of sea adjacent to its coast called the territorial sea. 38 This provision codified long-standing customary international law. The
sovereignty extends to the airspace over the territorial sea, as well
as to its bed and subsoil. 39 Despite attempts to settle the issue at
UNCLOS I and II, there is as yet no multilateral treaty delimiting
the breadth of this belt of sea. The result of this is that many States
have established twelve nautical mile limits, while some nations,
such as the United States, still have three nautical mile limits, and
others have extended to 200 nautical miles.
The "sovereignty" of a coastal State in its territorial sea is almost as extensive as its sovereignty over its land territory. It has
complete virtual and exclusive authority over siting. This is subject
to a duty not to hamper innocent passage of non-coastal State's
ships and submarines via the blocking of established sealanes with
ocean energy devices.'
Certain ocean energy devices would be "ships" for the purpose
of the rules of innocent passage in the territorial sea. An OTEC
plantship, for example, at least when not exploring or exploiting the
thermal resource, would be a device falling into this category. The
meaning of "passage" is defined by the Convention as "navigation
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id., art. 13.
Id., art. 8.
Id., art. 9.
Id., art. 11.
ICNT, supra note 10, art. 7(2).
Cf.id., art. 6 on reefs.
Territorial Sea Conv., supra note 16, art. 1(I).
Id., art. 2.
See note 25 supra.
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through the territorial sea for the purpose either of traversing that
waters,
sea without entering internal waters, proceeding to internal
4
or of making for the high seas from internal waters." '
If a device is a "ship," the question arises whether it would be
navigating for the purpose of "traversing" the territorial sea while it
simultaneously exploited the thermal or other energy resource.
Under the provisions of the ICNT, as seen below, the picture is
clearer, for activities not related to passage are clearly enjoined.42
However, the Convention fails to distinguish clearly between primary and incidental purposes. The use of the definite article in
"the purpose" implies that only traversing is permitted. This would
exclude energy resource exploitation.
The ICNT envisages a mileage limit of twelve nautical miles
for the territorial sea. 43 As mentioned above, many States have already extended their limits to this distance, while others have established greater or lesser breadths. The ICNT also provides that
passage would not be innocent if the ship engages in "any. . . activity not having a direct bearing on passage."' This general statement would seem to clearly preclude energy resource exploitation
by foreign "ships" exercising the right of innocent passage.
3. The ContinentalShelf Coastal States have resource jurisdiction over the continental shelf.45 The shelf is defined by the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf as the seabed and
subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast.' The continental shelf regime only prevails beyond territorial waters, because
the coastal State has sovereignty in such waters. Where a general
resource zone has been established, the shelf regime prevails beyond that, because the resource jurisdiction over the zone is inclusive of shelf jurisdiction and more extensive. No mileage limit is
established for the continental shelf by the Convention. Instead,
the limit is reached where the depth of the superjacent waters
reaches 200 meters, or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the
superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural re47
sources of the shelf.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Territorial Sea Conv., supra note 16, art. 14(2).
ICNT, supra note 10, art. 19(2)(1).
Id., art. 3.
See note 42 supra.
Continental Shelf Cony., supra note 16, art. 2.
Id., art. I.
Id.

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol11/iss3/9

8

Joseph: Legal Issues Confronting the Exploitation of Renewable Sources of
EXPLOITATION OF RENEWABLE

ENERGY SOURCES

The Convention states that the coastal State exercises "sovereign rights" over the continental shelf, for the sole purpose of exploring or exploiting its natural resources.4" These rights are
exclusive and do not depend upon any coastal State assertion of
jurisdiction over the shelf resources. 49 The term "natural resources" is defined as the mineral and other nonliving resources of
the seabed and subsoil, and certain living organisms which live on
the shelf.50 The rights of the coastal State over the shelf do not
affect the legal status of the superjacent waters as high seas, or that
of the airspace above.5 1 The provisions give the coastal State exclusive authority over the shelf only for the purpose of exploring or
exploiting
its resources. It can prevent other States from doing the
52
same.
The ocean geothermal resource falls within the definition of a
continental shelf resource. The negotiating history of the Convention on the Continental Shelf indicates that the ocean biomass on
the shelf seabed is probably also a shelf resource. The Convention
defines shelf resources as follows:
The natural resources referred to in these articles consist of the
mineral and other non-living resources of the seabed and subsoil
together with living organisms belonging to sedentary species,
that is to say, organisms which at the harvestable stage, either are
in
immobile on or under the seabed or are unable to move except
53
constant physical contact with the seabed or the subsoil.
In its commentary to its draft articles prepared in 1956, the International Law Commission referred to marine flora in the following
statement.
At the eighth session it was proposed that the condition of permanent attachment to the seabed should be mentioned in the article itself. At the same time the opinion was expressed that the
condition should be made less strict; it would be sufficient that
the marine fauna and flora in question should live in constant
physical biological relationship with the seabed and the continental shelf. . ..
The International Law Commission's commentary is not in it48. Id., art. 2(l).
49. Id., art. 2(3).
50. Id., art. 2(4).
51. Id., art. 3.
52. See Commentary to Draft Article 68, 2 Y.B. INT'L. L. COMM'N 297, para. 2, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/Ser.A/1956/Add. 1.
53. See note 50 supra.
54. Commentary to Draft Article 68, supra note 52, para. 4.
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self a statement of the law. However, the wording of Article 2(A)
and the International Law Commission's commentary suggest that
ocean biomass is included as "living organisms belonging to sedentary species" except floating biomass which is not attached to the
seabed. Such floating biomass would be exploitable under the doctrine of the high seas.5 5
As will be seen later, under the doctrine of the freedom of the
high seas, ocean energy resources can be exploited by any State, so
long as reasonable regard is paid to the exercise of high seas freedoms by other States. The question which is of concern here is
whether the high seas right to exploit an energy resource, such as
the thermal gradient, permits a State to affix a device to a foreign
continental shelf, particularly if the coastal State objects on the basis that it intends to exploit shelf resources on the same site.
The coastal State is not given "sovereignty" over the continental shelf, but only "sovereign rights." The reason for this was noted
by the International Law Commission in its Commentary to its
draft articles prepared for UNCLOS I.
The Commission desired to avoid language lending itself to interpretations alien to an object which the Commission considers
to be of decisive importance, namely, the safeguarding of the
principle of the full freedom of the superjacent sea and the air
space above it. Hence it was unwilling to accept the sovereignty
of the coastal State over the seabed and subsoil of the continental
56

shelf.

The extent of the coastal State rights on and in the shelf itself, as
opposed to rights in the superjacent waters and airspace, could
therefore still correctly be described as sovereignty. The rationale
for the use of the term "rights" was not intended as a limitation of
the rights on the shelf itself, as it only referred to the rights in the
waters and airspace above.
Article 5(1) of the Convention states that the exploitation of
the natural resources of the shelf "must not result in any unjustifiable interference with navigation, fishing or the conservation of the
living resources of the sea."' 57 There is no corresponding provision
in the Convention on the High Seas. However, the ICNT does
make the freedom to construct artificial islands subject to the continental shelf regime.5 8 In the absence of a similar provision in the
55.
56.
57.
58.

See
See
See
Id.,

text accompanying notes 63-64 infra.
note 52, supra.
also ICNT, supra note 10, art. 78(2).
art. 87(1)(d).
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Convention, it is not clear whether priority is given to high seas
freedoms or continental shelf rights, or whether there should be a
balancing of the affected interests.
The ICNT contains provisions which would significantly affect
the present legal position on the continental shelf with regard to
ocean energy devices. UNCLOS III is currently working on a new
formula for defining the breadth of the shelf.59
The ICNT states that Article 60 applies, mutatis mutandis, (te.,
with all necessary modifications) to artificial islands, installations
and structures on the continental shelf.60 Article 60(1) states as follows:
In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State shall have the
exclusive right to construct and to authorize and regulate the
construction, operation and use of:
(a) Artificial islands;
(b) Installations and structures for the purposes provided
for in article 56 and other economic purposes;
(c) Installations and structures which may interfere with
the exercise of the rights of the coastal State in the zone.
Application of this Article, without any modification, would
effectively abolish the right of non-coastal States to emplace or affix
ocean energy devices on the continental shelf in order to exercise
their right to exploit the high seas energy resources. 6 ' Although the
words mutatis mutandis mean that Article 60 as a whole is to be
modified as necessary, the extent of the modification is not made
clear.
In 1969, the International Court of Justice broadened the continental shelf concept by defining it as a prolongation or continuation of the land territory.6 2 If the ICNT is read in the light of that
case, it might well be interpreted in favor of greater coastal State
rights. If Article 80 is interpreted in this way, and the broadness of
Article 81 would support such an interpretation, Article 60 could be
applied so as to exclude ocean energy devices affixed to the continental shelf absent control State consent.
Article 81 states that the coastal State shall have "the exclusive
59. See, Id., art. 76.
60. Id., art. 80.
61. This interpretation is supported by ICNT supra note 10, art. 87(l)(d), making the
high seas freedom to construct artificial islands subject to the continental regime.
62. North Sea Continental Shelf Case, Judgment of Feb. 20, 1969 (Federal Republic of
Germany/Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany/Netherlands) [19691 I.C.J. Rep. 3, digested and excerpted in 63 AJ.I.L. 591 (1961); reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 340 (1969).
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right to authorize and regulate drilling on the continental shelf for
all purposes." The word "drilling" could be interpreted either to
include or exclude drilling for the purpose of placing the foundations of a structure not exploring or exploiting the resources of the
shelf. The use of the words "for all purposes" implies that nonshelf resource related drilling would be subject to coastal State jurisdiction, thereby supporting an interpretation of Article 80 of the
ICNT in favor of greater coastal State rights.
The ICNT would establish a system of payments and contributions to the International Sea-bed Authority, with respect to the exploitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 miles.6 3
4. The High Seas. The concept of the high seas has been
present in State practice for hundreds of years. The term "high
seas" is defined as all parts of the sea that are not included in the
territorial sea or in the internal waters of a State.' This is an international area, open to certain specified freedoms and reasonable
use by all nations. The Geneva Convention on the High Seas codified the applicable principles. The critical Article as far as the siting and operation of ocean energy facilities on the high seas is
Article 2, which reads as follows:
The high seas being open to all nations, no State may validly
purport to subject any part of them to its sovereignty. Freedom
of the high seas is exercised under the conditions laid down by
these articles and by the other rules of international law. It comprises, inter alia, both for coastal and non-coastal States:
1. Freedom on navigation;
2. Freedom of fishing;
3. Freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines;
4. Freedom to fly over the high seas.
These freedoms, and others which are recognized by the general principles of international law, shall be exercised by all States with reasonable regard to the interests of other States in their exercise of the
freedom of the high seas.
The inclusion of the words inter alia was intended to establish that
the list of enumerated freedoms is not exhaustive. The final sentence of the article expressly recognizes the possibility of other legitimate uses.
It should be noted that this right to use the high seas is expressed as a "freedom." The right to fish on the high seas is de63. ICNT, Art. 82,
64. High Seas Conv., supra note 19, art. 1.
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scribed by Article 2 as a "freedom" to fish. There is no reference to
a property right in the fish themselves. Once the freedom to fish
has been exercised and the fish are caught and appropriated, property rights do arise in them, i e., the fish are res nullius. An analogy
might be drawn with high seas energy resources. There would initially be a freedom to exploit them, not a property right in them.
There would be no question of property rights in them until appropriation has occurred.
Whether the deployment of an ocean energy device would be a
high seas freedom would be dependent on a balancing of the affected interests in each case. Fixed ocean energy devices would by
their very presence exclude other high seas freedoms in the space
they occupy. Navigation and fishing might be affected for example.
However, other States must also take into account the interests of
the State in exploiting the energy resource. As the oceans are so
vast, the deployment of almost all ocean energy devices on the high
seas should be regarded as reasonable. It could also be argued that
a State has authority to grant site exclusivity on the high seas as a
freedom and because it would be generally unreasonable for another State to hamper any other State's exercise of the freedom to
exploit the energy resources.
The ICNT counterpart to Article 2 of the Convention on the
High Seas reads as follows:
Freedom of the high seas
1. The high seas are open to all States, whether coastal or landlocked. Freedom of the high seas is exercised under the conditions laid down by this Convention and by other rules of international law. It comprises, inter alia, both for coastal and landlocked States:
(a) Freedom of navigation;
(b) Freedom of overflight;
(c) Freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines subject
to Part VI;
(d) Freedom to construct artificial islands and other installations permitted under international law, subject to
Part VI;
(e) Freedom of fishing, subject to the conditions laid down
in Section 2;
(f) Freedom of scientific research, subject to Parts VI and
XIII.
2. These freedoms shall be exercised by all States, with due
consideration for the interests of other States in their exercise of
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the freedom of the high seas, and also with due consideration for
the rights under this Convention with respect to activities in the
Area.6 5

There are textual differences from Article 2 which should be
noted. First, the words "and others [ie., freedoms] which are recognized by the general principles of international law" are omitted.
The words were perhaps omitted because they were superfluous.
Whatever the reason, this omission in itself is inconsequential, because the words inter alia are retained.
Secondly, the ICNT uses the words "due consideration" instead of the words "reasonable regard." This is probably meant to
symbolize that the balancing of high seas freedoms against the
common heritage rights is somehow jurisprudentially different than
the balancing of two claims to high seas freedoms. This change
should not affect the practical application of the high seas freedom
doctrine with respect to ocean energy devices.
B. New Concepts and the Third United Nations Conference on
the Law of the Sea
The inaugural session of the Third United Nations Conference
on the Law of the Sea convened in 1973. At the time of writing the
Conference had completed the first phase of its ninth session and
was due to hold the second phase in late 1980. No provisions had
been formally voted upon by the Conference for inclusion in the
Law of the Sea treaty. However, the practice of States and the consensus of many of the Conference participants suggested that some
new concepts, which will affect ocean energy, had either become or
might subsequently enter international law. These concepts include archipelagic waters, exclusive economic zones, the "common
heritage of mankind," and the creation of an International Sea-bed
Authority to manage common heritage seabed and subsoil activities
and resources.
1. Archipelagic Waters. Although the question of a special
regime for archipelagoes was raised at UNCLOS I, no such regime
was adopted in the Geneva Conventions. However, some archipelagic States subsequently drew their baselines to join the outermost
points of their outermost islands, thereby enclosing large bodies of
water where no international regime had been agreed upon. The
ICNT states that straight baselines may be drawn joining the outer65. ICNT, supra note 10, art. 87.
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most islands and drying reefs of an archipelagic State,6 6 within certain limitations. 67 Foreign vessels would have rights of archipelagic
sealanes passage or innocent passage in the enclosed waters. 68 An
ocean energy device would have to be placed so as not to hamper
the exercise of these rights of navigation.
2. The Exclusive Economic Zone. Many States have established general or specific resource zones of varying breadths, sometimes described as "exclusive economic zones." Most of these
extend to 200 nautical miles. In such zones, the coastal State exercises exclusive jurisdiction over some or all natural resources.6 9
This concept has been adopted in the ICNT. In a zone which may
extend to 200 nautical miles, the coastal State would have
[s]overeign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting,
conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living
or non-living, of the seabed and subsoil and superjacent waters,
and with regard to other activities for the economic exploitation
and exploration of the zone, such as the production of energy
from the water, currents and winds.7°
Article 60(1) provides that the coastal State in its exclusive economic zone has the "exclusive right to construct and to authorize
and regulate the construction, operation and use" of artificial islands, installations and structures for the purpose of exploiting the
natural resources over which it has jurisdiciton.
It is clear, therefore, that with respect to the siting and operation of ocean energy devices, the coastal State would have complete
and exclusive authority over siting and operations. 7 '
3. The "Common Heritage of Mankind " In 1970, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted a resolution, which
included the following paragraphs.
1. The sea-bed and ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof, beyond
the limits of national jurisdiction (hereinafter referred to as the
area), as well as the resources of the area, are the common heritage of mankind.
2. The area shall not be subject to appropriation by any means
66.
67.
68.
69.
nautical
70.
71.

Examples of archipelagic States are Indonesia, Fiji, Philipines and Mauritius.
ICNT, supra note 10, art. 47(l).
Id., Arts. 52-54.
E.g., the U.S. Fishery and Conservation Management Act of 1976 establishes a 200
mile fishery zone with the exception of tuna.
ICNT, supra note 10, art. 65(l)(a).
Id., art. 56(1)(b) grants jurisdiction over the use of installations.
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by States or persons, natural or juridical, and no State shall
claim or7 2exercise sovereignty or sovereign rights over any part
thereof.

The ICNT also embodies the "common heritage" concept. To
what extent it is part of customary international law is a matter of
dispute between industrialized nations, who have the technological
capability to exploit seabed resources such as manganese nodules,
and the "group of seventy-seven." The ICNT provisions dealing
with the "Area" must be reviewed in order to assess whether there
would be any effect on ocean energy device deployment if they become binding. They will become binding on some or all States, by
virtue of the ratification of a law of the sea treaty, or possibly in the
case of the more generalized provisions, if they become effectively
recognized in State practice.
The "common heritage of mankind" concept extends to the
"Area" and its resources. The "Area" is defined as "the seabed and
ocean floor and subsoil thereof beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. ' 73 In the context of the ICNT as a whole, this is intended
to mean beyond the exclusive economic zone and continental shelf.
The status of the waters, including the thermal gradient above the
Area, are not affected by the common heritage concept.
The International Sea-bed Authority would be the organization through which the States Parties would organize and control
"activities in the Area."7 4 This latter term, which is a shorthand
description of the jurisdiction of the authority, is defined as "all
activities of exploration for, and exploration of, the resources of the
Area. '75 Two questions with respect to the impending regime affect the siting of ocean energy devices. First, which ocean energy
resources are also common heritage resources? Secondly, how
would ocean energy activities not exploiting "Area" resources be
affected by the new regime?
With respect to the first question, the status of the superjacent
waters and airspace above the seabed would remain high seas.7 6
Only the seabed and subsoil are included in the common heritage
concept, so the thermal gradient resource would not be part of it.
Consequently, the only energy resources which could conceivably
be part of the area are the geothermal and biomass resources. The
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

G.A. Res. 2749 (XXV) Dec. 17, 1970, paras. I & 2.
ICNT, supra note 10. art. I(I).
Id., art. 157(l).
Id., art. 1(3).
Id., art. 135.
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ICNT defines "resources" to mean mineral resources in SitU.7 7
Minerals would include the following categories.
(i) Liquid or gaseous substances at or beneath the surface such
as petroleum, gas, condensate, helium, and also sulphur and salts
extracted in liquid form.
(ii) Solid substances occurring on the surface or at depths of
less than the three metres below the surface, including
polymetallic nodules.
(iii) Solid substances at depths of more than three metres below
the surface.
(iv) Metal-bearing brine at or beneath the surface.78
This definition would not include geothermal or biomass resources.
In Article 133 of the ICNT revision 1, the words "water, steam and
hot water" were included. These words have now been deleted and
the geothermal resource is thereby excluded. Biomass is not a mineral and therefore does not fall within the definition.
Regarding the second question, how would ocean energy activities not exploiting "Area" resources be affected by the new regime, a fixed support or a mooring device would be using the
"Area" without constituting an "activity" therein. Could the International Sea-bed Authority validly object to such a use of the seabed? The ICNT states:
No State shall claim or exercise sovereignty or sovereign rights
over any part of the Area or its resources, nor shall any State or
natural or juridical person appropriate any part thereof. No
such claim or exercise of sovereignty or sovereign rights, nor
such appropriation shall be recognized.7 9
The question is whether the use of the seabed in the way we are
concerned with would constitute an attempt to claim "sovereignty"
or "sovereign rights," or would be an illegal "appropriation." It
may be contended that this provision could be interpreted in such a
way as to prohibit the fixing, or even mooring of facilities on the
seabed. However, this would be a great hindrance to the exercise of
a valid high seas freedom, a result which UNCLOS III would probably not sanction. The ICNT clearly envisages the use of high seas
freedoms on the seabed. It refers to the high seas freedoms to construct artificial islands and other installations.8 0 Morever, this free77.
seabed
78.
79.
80.

Id., an. 133(b). The meaning of the Latin "in situ" in this context must refer to the
and subsoil.
Id., art 133 (c).
Id., art. 137(I).
ICNT, supra note 10, art. 87(d).
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dom is expressly subject to the continental shelf regime while not
being subject to the "common heritage" regime. This implies that
the "common heritage" regime does not prohibit the emplacement
of ocean energy devices on the seabed.
II.

JURISDICTION OVER OCEAN ENERGY DEVICES AND PERSONS
ON BOARD.

Here we are concerned with determining which State has competence in international law to prescribe and enforce its laws over
an ocean energy device, and the persons on board.
A.

High Seas

The Convention on the High Seas of 1958 states as follows:
Each State shall fix the conditions for the grant of its nationality
to ships, for registration of ships in its territory, and for the right
to fly its flag. Ships have the nationality of the State whose flag
they are entitled to fly. There must exist a genuine link between
the State and the ship; in particular, the State must effectively
exercise its jurisdiction and control in administrative,
technical
8
and social matters over ships flying its flag.
The Convention further states that ships may sail under the flag of
only one State. s2
Ships are assimilated to territory for the purpose of jurisdiction, because when considered from the standpoint of public order,
a single municipal legal system is necessary to regulate people on
board. It would not be practical to repeatedly change legal systems
as the ship passes through foreign waters. The need for certainty
resulted in the choice of flag State jurisdiction, and rejection of
other theories of jurisdiction including the State of the owner's nationality, or the State with the closest relationship.
OTEC plantships and some other moving ocean energy devices would be "ships" for the purposes of jurisdiction. However,
fixed ocean energy devices do not have the voyaging characteristic.8 3 With respect to such devices and other structures on the high
seas, which are not "ships," the law is not settled. There is no recognition of this gap in the Convention. In customary international
81. High Seas Cony., supra note 19, art. 5(1).
82. Id., art. 6(1).
83. Moored devices, such as the moored "Mini-OTEC" facility off Hawaii, or the converted Navy tanker which will also be moored and will primarily test heat exchangers,
known as "OTEC-1", do not have the voyaging characteristics. Nothing in the law says that
they must, but in the writer's view they should be assimilated to fixed structures nonetheless.
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law, however, States may prescribe and enforce laws for its nationals anywhere. State practice also recognizes the existence of limited
passive nationality or "protective" jurisdiction. That is to say, the
competence to prescribe and enforce laws against non-nationals to
protect State interests or nationals.
Jurisdiction based on nationality is unsatisfactory as a basis for
regulating activities on board, or for regulating the device itself.
This is due to the likelihood of a multiplicity of nationalities being
involved, each with conflicting rules. As with ships, there is a need
for a rule which would make a single legal system applicable to
"non-ship-like" devices. There is no basis in international law for
determining which State should have such jurisdiction.
The most certainty would be provided by selecting a "flag"
state and applying its law. In the absence of the selection of a flag
State, or where there were two or more appropriate flags, the device
would be treated as Stateless and subject to the principles of customary international law of nationality jurisdiction. The best solution to the problem is therefore to attribute nationality to such
devices.
Flags of convenience should be treated in the same way as
ships. Although Article 5 speaks of a "genuine link," which is said
to mean that the State must regulate the daily lives of those on
board,84 many ships sail under the flags of nations with which there
is no genuine link. 5 In practice, the flag is respected as valid and
such ships are not treated as Stateless resulting in the law of the flag
prevailing. It is, however, posssible that there will be some future
enforcement of the genuine link rule, but that question and its implications are beyond the scope of this paper.
It should be noted that fixing an ocean energy device to the
seabed to exploit a non-common heritage resource would not inyoke the jurisdiction of the International Sea-bed Authority for all
purposes. Its authority extends only to activities for the exploration
or exploitation of the seabed and not to the regulation of the people
on-board the device.8 6
B.

The Exclusive Economic Zone

The ICNT would grant exclusive jurisdiction over fixed struc84.
85.
provide
86.

This element has been omitted from the ICNT, supra note 10, art. 91(1).
Eg., Liberia, Panama. See ICNT, supra note 10, art. 94(1). The ICNT does not
for sanctions where there is no "genuine link."
See ICNT, supra note 10, art. 157(1).
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tures exploiting energy resources in the Exclusive Economic Zone
to the coastal State. 7 The terms used to define fixed structures are
"artificial islands, installations and structures.""8 Whether this includes ships, such as foreign OTEC plantships exploiting the zone
resources, could be reduced to an issue of little practical importance
if when the coastal State grants permission to foreign ships to exploit the resources, it makes bilateral arrangements regarding jurisdiction. If no bilateral arrangements are made, jurisdiction should
probably be presumed to be in the flag State, due to the policy arguments against repeatedly changing the legal system on board
when entering different jurisdictions.
C. The ContinentalShelf
The Convention on the Continental Shelf provides that the
coastal State has jurisdiction over all facilities exploring or exploiting resources of the shelf.8 9 The ICNT states that Article 60 would
apply mutatis mutandis (i.e., with all necessary modifications) to artificial islands, installations and structures on the continental
shelf.9" There is no express qualification that such structures must
be exploring or exploiting shelf resources. Article 60(2) reads:
The coastal State shall have exclusive jurisdiction over. . . artificial islands, installations and structures [covered by Article
60(1)], including jurisdiction with regard to customs, fiscal,
health, safety and immigration regulations.
It has been noted that the continental shelf concept seems to have
become enlarged by a decision of the International Court of Justice. 9' Moreover, Article 81, which would grant the coastal State
the exclusive right to authorize and regulate drilling on the shelf
"for all purposes," is consistent with the trend toward greater rights
for the coastal State with respect to the shelf.
There is no legal basis for granting the coastal State jurisdiction over devices exploiting water or airspace resources, just because the shelf is being used for support. Such devices should be
regarded as on the high seas and subject to the principles applicable
therein. Consequently, the flexibility in interpretation permitted by
the use of the words mutatis mutandis should preclude coastal State
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id., art. 60(2).
Id.
Continental Shelf Cony., supra note 16, art. 5(4).
ICNT, supra note 10, art. 80.
See note 62 supra.
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jurisdiction over shelf supported structures that are not exploiting
shelf resources.
The Contiguous Zone
The Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone provides that in a zone of the high seas contiguous to
the territorial sea, the coastal State may exercise the necessary control to prevent and punish infringement within its territorial sea of
customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary regulations.92 The breadth
of this zone may not exceed twelve nautical miles from the territorial sea baseline.93 The ICNT would extend the permissible
breadth of the zone to 24 nautical miles.9 4
D.

E Territorial,Archpelagic and Internal Waters
The coastal State has territorial jurisdiction over all facilities in
territorial, archipelagic, or internal waters. This means that these
areas are treated as if they were dryland for the purpose of prescribing and enforcing law. This even extends to ships exercising the
right of innocent passage. However, it is subject to the provisions
in the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone
and their counterparts in the ICNT, which state that territorial jurisdiction should not be exercised on board ships passing through
the territorial sea. 95 The coastal State's jurisdiction over ships traversing territorial waters does not exclude flag State jurisdiction.
However, the coastal State generally refrains from exercising jurisdiction, except where it regards its peace and order as disturbed.9 6
The ICNT does not provide for any change in the regime of territorial jurisdiction over territorial seas, internal and archipelagic waters.
F

Jurisdictionover Submarine Cables

The coastal State has jurisdiction over cables in its territorial
sea by virtue of its territorial jurisdiction therein. Jurisdiction
could effectively be obtained over foreign ocean energy devices
connected to shore by electrical transmission cable, even though
coastal State jurisdiction would not normally pertain to the facility
itself. The context in which this method of acquiring jurisdiction is
92. Territorial Sea Conv., supra note 16, art. 24(1).
93. Id., art. 24(2).
94. Id., art. 33(2).
95. Id., arts. 19 & 20.
96. This is based on comity rather than customary international law. See Wildenhus's
Case, 120 U.S. I, 7 S.Ct. 385.
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needed is where no general resource zone is established. Since
most States have, and eventually all coastal States which can will
probably establish such zones, the validity of this jurisdictional basis will be of little practical importance. It is really based on the
need for a coastal State to consent to laying submarine cables in
territorial waters. It is merely another way of saying that such consent can be conditioned upon a grant of jurisdiction to the coastal
State, regardless of which State would otherwise have jurisdiction
in international law. This is a perfectly valid condition to make
and is relied upon in pending U.S. legislation.9 7
III. SUBMARINE CABLES AND PIPELINES
Many ocean energy devices will be connected to shore by electrical transmission cables or pipelines. The question of where these
can be laid is dealt with in the Geneva Conventions and the ICNT.
There is no provision in the Convention on the Territorial Sea
and the Contiguous Zone permitting non-coastal States to place
submarine cables in territorial waters. The coastal State, by virtue
of its sovereignty therein, can prohibit them. It has jurisdiction
over all cables and pipelines within its territorial waters. The Convention on the Continental Shelf provides that, subject to its right
to take "reasonable measures" for the exploration and exploitation
of the natural resources of the continental shelf, the coastal State
may not impede the laying or maintenance of submarine cables or
pipelines on the shelf.9 8 The Convention on the High Seas also
specifically refers to the high seas freedom to lay submarine cables
and pipelines.99
The ICNT permits the laying of submarine cables and pipelines in the exclusive economic zone'0° and on the continental
shelf."' The international seabed area is also open to the laying of
02
submarine cables, as an enumerated high seas freedom.
The Convention for the Protection of Submarine Cables of
1884,103 to which the United States and over 30 other countries are
parties, deals with submarine cables beyond territorial waters. Ar97. See Report on Legislative Action in the United States Congress to Establish a Legal
Regime for OTEC, Appendix A infra. On the question of who has jurisdiction to protect
cables beyond the territorial sea, see text accompanying notes 98-104 infra.
98. Continental Shelf Cony., supra note 16, art. 4.
99. High Seas Cony., supra note 19, art. 2(3).
100. ICNT, supra note 10, art. 58(1).
101. Id., art. 79(l).
102. Id., art. 87(l)(c).
103. USTS 380
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ticle II provides that the breaking or injury of a submarine cable,
done willfully or through culpable negligence, shall be a punishable
offense. The punishment inflicted would not be a bar to a civil action for damages. The U.S. Congress is considering bills which
would include provisions for the protection of submarine cables,
establishing penalties and leaving open the option of a civil suit.'
IV.

OCEAN ENERGY RELATED MARINE SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH

No rational deployment of an ocean energy device would be
conceivable without prior on-site research into the resource and the
prevailing conditions for exploiting it. In the case of OTEC, for
example, extensive research into the temperature differential, currents, climate and living resources would be essential. In the territorial sea, the coastal State can exercise its sovereignty to prohibit
scientific research. This situation is unchanged in the ICNT.° 5
The Convention on the Continental Shelf states as follows:
The consent of the coastal State shall be obtained in respect of
any research concerning the continental shelf and undertaken
there. Nevertheless, the coastal State shall not normally withhold its consent if the request is submitted by a qualified institution with a view to purely scientific research into the physical or
biological characteristics of the continental shelf, subject to the
proviso that the coastal State shall have the right if it so desires,
to participate or to be represented in the research, and that in
any event the results shall be published.' °6
In practice, consent is often not given for research on the continental shelf. This would be an obstacle to ocean energy development,
for example, core samples always need to be taken before building
a platform.
The ICNT Articles dealing with scientific research represent
very serious problems for ocean energy device deployment. The
coastal state has a veto over research activities by foreigners in its
exclusive economic zone and on its continental shelf. 0 7 The
ICNT's only qualification on its unbalanced compromise between
coastal State control and the needs of mankind is a great deal of
non-right conferring language.' 0 8 It would therefore be impossible
for a coastal State that wished to deploy an ocean energy device in
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

S. 2492 & H.R. 6154, see Appendix A for a discussion of this legislation.
ICNT, supra note 10, art. 245.
Continental Shelf Conv., supra note 16, art. 5(8). Cf. art. 5(1).
ICNT, supra note 10, art. 246(1).
Id., arts. 246 & 252.
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its own exclusive economic zone to conduct research into the environmental conditions in its neighboring State's zone without that
State's consent.
Although scientific research is not one of the enumerated freedoms in the Convention on the High Seas, it has always been regarded as such in State practice. Article 87 of the ICNT does
mention it as a high seas freedom. The ICNT, in article 143(3),
also provides that State Parties may carry out marine scientific research in the International Seabed Area. 10 9
V.

THE ENVIRONMENT

There are presently three sources of marine environmental
law. First, there is a general principle of international law that a
State owes a duty to protect other States against injurious acts
caused by it or its individuals, emanating from activities or areas
over which it has jurisdiction.I 0 Second, -there are national laws
regulating particular areas, activities, structures or persons. The
United States Congress is currently considering bills which would
establish an environmental regime for OTEC, as part of a comprehensive licensing scheme." l ' Third, numerous conventions have
been concluded under the auspices of the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO). Although there are as yet
no conventions specifically regulating ocean energy devices, many
existing conventions would affect both moving vessels and fixed or
floating platforms.1 12
109. Id., art. 143(3).
110. The Trail Smelter Case, III U.N.R.I.A.A. 1905 (1949).
111. See Report on Legislative Action in the United States Congress to Establish a Legal
Regime for OTEC, Appendix A infra.
112. For example, the Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping
from Ships and Aircraft, signed at Oslo, February 15, 1972; as cited in I S. ODA, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE OCEAN DEVELOPMENT 505 (1972), states in art. I as follows:
The contracting Parties pledge themselves to take all possible steps to prevent the
pollution of the sea by substances that are liable to create hazards to human health,
to harm living resources and marine life, to damage amenities or to interfere with
other legitimate uses of the sea.
The Convention controls the dumping of materials and might apply to OTEC plantships but
not fixed or moored facilities because the term "ships" is defined as seagoing vessels of any
type whatsoever, excluding fixed or floating platforms.
The Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumpting of Wastes and
Other Matter, done Dec. 29, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 2403, T.I.A.S. No. 8165; conveniently found in
11 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 1291 (1972), regulates with the dumping of "waste and other matter
that is liable to create hazards to human health, to harm living resources and marine life, to
damage amenities or to interfere with other legitimate uses of the sea." "Dumping" is defined as any deliberate disposal at sea from vessels, platforms or other man-made structures,
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UNCLOS III has approached the law of marine environment
by laying down general principles and rules, rather than attempting
to formulate details. The ICNT contains a broad legal framework
which would be superimposed on the numerous multilateral treaties and national laws. Where States are not already bound by particular treaties, the intention is to bind them to general rules
beyond the very limited obligation of customary international law
referred to above. The relationship between the ICNT Articles and
existing or future conventions is explained in Article 237.
1. The provisions of this Part [i e., Part XII, dealing with the
protection and preservation of the marine environment] are
without prejudice to the specific obligations assumed by States
under special conventions and agreements concluded previously
which relate to the protection and preservation of the marine environment and to agreements which may be concluded in furtherance of the general principles set forth in this Convention.
2. Specific obligations assumed by States under special conventions, with respect to the protection and preservation of the
marine environment, should be carried out in a manner consisthe general principles and objectives of this Conventent with
3
tion.' t

Article 192 of the ICNT provides that States have the obligation to protect and preserve the environment. The remaining environmental provisions in the ICNT complement this theme with
and a vessel is defined as any waterborne craft of any type whatsoever. This formulation
would seem to include both fixed and moored OTEC facilities and plantships.
The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, done November 2, 1973, I.M.C.O. Doc. MP/Conf. W.P.35 (1973), applies to "ships" which term is defined
as a vessel of any type whatsoever operating in the marine environment, and includes fixed
or floating platforms. Annex II contains regulations for the control of pollution by noxious
liquid substances in bulk, a term not defined by fixed quantity and which might include
OTEC's working fluid or products produced on board plantships. Annex IV regulates the
prevention of pollution by sewage from ships and Annex V regulates the prevention of pollution by garbage from ships.
The Protocol Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Marine Pollution by
Substances Other than Oil, I.M.C.O. Doc. MP/Conf./W.P.35 (November 2, 1973); conveniently found in 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 577 (1974) and 13 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 605 (1974), grants

Contracting States the right to "interfere" following a marine casualty or acts which may
reasonably be expected to result in major harmful effects. In such circumstances, States may
take such measures on the high seas as may be necessary to prevent, mitigate or eliminate
grave and imminent danger to their coastline or related interests from pollutioin or threat of
pollutioin by substances other than oil. A "substance other than oil" includes those contained in a protocol to the Convention "and those other substances which are liable to create
hazards to human health, to harm living resources and marine life, to damage amenities or to
interfere with other legitimate uses of the sea."
113. ICNT, supra note 10, art. 237.

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1981

25

California Western
International Law Journal, Vol. 11, No. 3 [1981], Art. 9 Vol.
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

II

general obligations and a system of enforcement. 114
Serious consideration might be given to the possibility of international conventions designed to deal with some of the special
problems that ocean energy device deployment would entail. For
example, the cooling of areas of water, or the use of biocides, are
environmental impacts that only OTEC produces. These effects
can be regulated in the design and construction stage. International
standards could be established for designing out a potential problem where possible. The previous Conventions, and the ICNT
which contains general obligations are inadequate. Both merely
regulate ocean energy devices in a general fashion and do not set
down precise criteria or standards. Thus, they are open to subjective interpretation.
VI.

TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER

The ICNT contains a section designed to promote the transference of marine technology to developing States. Article 266(1) provides that "[s]tates, directly or through competent international
organizations, shall cooperate within their capabilities to promote
actively the development and transfer of marine science and5
marine technology on fair and reasonable terms and conditions.""
Article 267 of the ICNT also provides that States, in promoting
such cooperation, shall have "proper regard for all legitimate interests, including, inter alia, the rights and duties of holders, suppliers
and recipients of marine technology." The rest of the provisions6
are framed in aspirational terms, with no specific legal directives. "

If the aspirations which underlie these provisions were to become reality, major industrial actors in ocean energy development
might reconsider their involvement. However, these provisions are
framed in ambitious terms and should not be regarded as legally
binding. Moreover, Article 267 provides a good basis to prevent
the transfer of proprietary information. So, too, does the qualification that States need only cooperate to the extent of their "capabilities." Furthermore, what are to be considered fair and reasonable
terms and conditions is left to the subjective determination of the
States concerned.
114. Id., arts. 193-236.
115. Id., art. 266(1).
116. Id., arts. 268-278.
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SAFETY AND REGULATIONS

The only reference to safety zones in the four Geneva Conventions is in the Convention on the Continental Shelf A coastal State
may establish safety zones with a radial of 500 meters around its
installations exploring and exploiting shelf resources." 7 The ICNT
confers on coastal State the same right in the exclusive economic
zone." 8 Article 80 of the ICNT applies the same to the continental
shelf.
A State can establish safety zones in its territorial sea, 9 provided they do not hamper innocent passage. Indeed, these zones
can be greater than 500 meters. On the high seas, the pertinent
question is whether the establishment of a safety zone would be a
reasonable use. It probably would be provided if it was not unreasonably large and it served a legitimate purpose.
Article 5 of the Convention on the Continental Shelf states
that the coastal state may take "measures necessary" for the protection of its devices in the safety zone. It states that ships must "respect" these safety zones.' 20 Article 60 of the ICNT, which applies
to the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf, allows the
to ensure
taking of "appropriate measures" within the safety zone,
12
the safety of navigation and of the protected structure.
There can be no doubt that these safety zones extend to the
airspace above the surface, and to the waters below. Although this
is not expressed in the Geneva Conventions or the ICNT, safety
zones with only one dimension would be useless, as they would not
keep aircraft and submarines clear of the danger area.
The regulatory regime at sea consists of rules relating to such
matters as design and construction standards, safety of life at sea,
navigational equipment requirements, communications and seaworthiness certification. There are two sources of these types of
rules; treaties and national legislation. The present rules are too
be studied and taken into
detailed to explore here, but they should
122
account by designers and engineers.
It is quite likely that the Maritime Safety Committee of the
117. Continental Shelf Conv., supra note 16, art. 5(2).
118. ICNT, supra note 10, art. 60(4).
119. By virtue of its sovereignty therein.
120. Continental Shelf Conv., supra note 16, art. 5(3).
121. ICNT, supra note 10, art. 60(4).
122. Eg., The Safety of Life at Sea Conventions of 1960 and 1974, done June 16, 1960,
16 U.S.T. 185, T.I.A.S. No. 5780, 536 U.N.T.S. 27, amended November 1, 1974.
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Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO),
will gradually begin to take into account the need to regulate some
features of ocean energy devices. So far, they have dealt mainly
with ships, but in recent years there has been a trend to regulate
fixed and floating installations. Planning would certainly be enhanced if these rules could be anticipated well in advance.
VIII.

LIMITATION OF LIABILITY

In the absence of an international scheme, national courts will
determine their own jurisdictional competence, in accordance with
domestic maritime or admiralty law, to hold a shipowner or a
member of the crew liable for damage. National law may limit the
extent of the available sanctions.
On the international plane, there are few agreements limiting
liability. These are all schemes applicable only to particular
problems.' 2 3 There is at present no international scheme which
would limit liability for damage caused by fixed ocean energy devices. Development of an international scheme for damage caused
by OTEC plants may be desirable.
IX.

CONCLUSION

The international law of the sea is presently in a state of flux.
The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea has
not yet concluded its work. However, it has produced a series of
123. The TOVALOP and CRISTAL schemes limiting liability for damage caused by oil
tankers are specific examples which can be cited.
TOVALOP is the acronym for the Tanker Owners Voluntary Agreement Concerning
Liability for Oil Pollution of 1969. Under TOVALOP, approximately 95 percent of the owners of the world's tanker tonnage agreed to provide a fund for reimbursing national cleanup
costs in the event of oil spills. Liability is limited to situations where the owner has been
unable to provide absence of fault and is limited to the lesser of $ 100 per gross registered ton
or $10 million.
CRISTAL stands for Contract Regarding an Interim Supplement to Tanker Liability
for Oil Pollution of 1979. Under CRISTAL, this amount of private coverage was supplemented by world oil owners who shipped crude oil on TOVALOP tankers. It covers more
contingencies than TOVALOP and gives coverage up to $30 million under a strict liability
standard.
The concept of these arrangements had been extended by an agreement among operators of North Sea exploration and production facilities effective during 1974 called OPOL
(Offshore Pollution Liability Agreement) prior to the North Sea Civil Liability Convention
coming into effect. See Faron, InternationalRegulatory Aspects of OTEC Development and
Operation, asfound in AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, DRAFT FINAL REPORT
110 (July 26, 1978) [submitted to the Department of Energy under ERDA Contract No. EG77-C-01-4118].

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol11/iss3/9

28

Joseph: Legal Issues Confronting the Exploitation of Renewable Sources of
EXPLOITATION OF RENEWABLE

ENERGY SOURCES

draft texts. Therefore, whether or not a new law of the sea treaty
results from the Conference, it is possible for international lawyers
to project, with a relatively high degree of certainty, what kind of
legal regime will prevail when ocean energy devices, apart from oil
and natural gas facilities, are deployed in the future.
The most important international law issues are, 1) who has
authority 6ver the siting of ocean energy structures and vessels,
and, 2) who has the right to exploit energy resources in particular
areas of ocean space. A number of general propositions can be
made. It must be emphasized that these propositions are extremely
general and will often be subject to exceptions.
1. From the land territory to the territorial sea limit, the
coastal State will have exclusive authority over siting. It owns the
energy resources in these waters, the airspace above them, and the
shelf or seabed below. It can be assumed that territorial seas will
generally extend to 12 nautical miles by the time OTEC and other
ocean energy devices are deployed.
2. Beyond the territorial sea limit, the coastal State will have
exclusive authority over the siting of devices which explore and exploit the geothermal and biomass resources which it owns in its
continental shelf. This does not mean that there are any rights
vested in the coastal State over the waters or airspace above the
shelf.
3. The resources of the shelf or seabed, waters and airspace
beyond the territorial sea, up to a limit of 200 nautical miles from
the coast, are becoming part of general national resource zones, as
more States establish them. The prospective Law of the Sea treaty
will embody a comprehensive regime for such zones. Coastal
States will have exclusive authority over the siting of all ocean energy structures and vessels exploiting the resources of the zone.
They have exclusive ownership of all the resources therein.
4. Beyond territorial waters where no general resource zones
are established, or beyond such zones if they are, the waters and
airspace, but not the seabed, are governed by the regime of the high
seas. There is a freedom to exploit the natural resources therein.
There would be no high seas freedom to unreasonably hinder the
exercise of this freedom to exploit these energy resources.
5. The prospective international seabed regime would vest
the resources of the deep seabed in mankind as a whole, to be managed by an International Sea-bed Authority. It would not affect the
geothermal, biomass or any other renewable energy resources. As
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the waters above the airspace are unaffected by the regime, no
mode of OTEC deployment would be affected.
6. Jurisdiction over ocean energy devices, that is, the competence to prescribe and enforce national laws to regulate or protect a
structure or moving device, will usually vest in the coastal State in
the case of fixed structures, and flag States in the case of moving
ones. Where a fixed structure is beyond 200 miles and a resource
zone of that breadth is established, or without an established zone
of 200 miles, beyond the territorial sea, where the fixed structure is
or, where the structure is on the continental shelf and shelf resources are not being exploited, the jurisdictional situation is uncertain.
7. The present and proposed marine scientific research regimes vest almost total discretion in the coastal State, failing to reflect a balance between coastal State needs and the needs of
mankind to exploit available energy resources.
A review of all the international issues in these and other areas
leads to the conclusion that the international legal situation on the
whole is very favorable for projected ocean energy exploitation
scenarios. National laws may, however, present problems which
need to be resolved.
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Appendix A
REPORT ON LEGISLATIVE ACTION IN THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS TO
ESTABLISH A LEGAL REGIME FOR

OTEC

At the time of writing, four bills respecting OTEC were pending
before the 96th U.S. Congress. S. 1830124 and H.R. 5796125 would accelerate the Department of Energy OTEC program to achieve early commercialization. S. 2492 2 6 and H.R. 6154127 would establish a licensing
regime and provide capital construction fund treatment and loan guarantees. The Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980121 signed into law on
April 2, 1980, provides tax credits for OTEC. The Congress has yet to
vote on the Fiscal Year 1981 authorizations and appropriations for the
Department of Energy OTEC program.
S. 2492 and H.R. 6154 have been reported by the Senate Commerce
Science and Transportation Committee and the House Merchant Marine
and Fisheries Committee respectively. The "Declaration of Policy" section of these two bills states in part:
(a) It is declared to be the purposes of the Congress in this Act
to(1) authorize and regulate the construction, location, ownership, and operation of ocean thermal energy conversion
facilities located in the territorial sea of the United States or
connected to the United States by pipeline or cable, consistent with the Convention on the High Seas and general
principles of international law;
(2) authorize and regulate the construction, location, ownership and operation of ocean thermal energy conversion
plantships documented under the laws of the United States,
consistent with the Convention on the High Seas and general principles of international law;
(3) authorize and regulate the construction, location, ownership and operation of ocean thermal energy conversion
plantships by United States citizens, consistent with the
High Seas and general principles of inConvention on the
29
ternational law.'
Section 3(11) defines an OTEC "facility" as any facility which is
124. Sponsored by Senator Matsunaga (D-Hawaii). Introduced on Sept. 27, 1979.
125. Sponsored by Representative Fuqua (D-Florida). Introduced on Nov. 2, 1979.
126. Sponsored by Senator Inouye (D-Hawaii).
127.
1979.

Introduced on March 27, 1980.

Sponsored by Representative Studds (D-Massachusetts). Introduced on Dec. 14,

128. Pub. L. No. 96-223.
129. S. 2492 and H.R. 6154, § 2.
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standing or moored in or beyond the territorial sea of the United
States.
Section 101(a) of both [S.2492 and H.R. 6154] provide as follows:
(a) No person may engage in the ownership, construction, or
operation of an ocean thermal energy conversion facility which
is documented under the laws of the United States by pipeline or
cable, except in accordance with a license issued under this Act.
No United States citizen may engage in the ownership, construction, or operation of an ocean thermal energy conversion plantship except in accordance with a license issued under this Act or
in accordance with a license issued by a foreign nation whose
licenses are found by the Administrator [of the National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)] after consultation
with the Secretary of State, to be compatible with licenses issued
under this Act.
No license can be granted by the Administrator of NOAA unless
will be documented under the laws
the OTEC facility or 13plantship
0
of the United States.
A different version of H.R. 6154 was before the House
Merchant Marine and Fisheries Subcommittees on Oceanography
and Merchant Marine. It would have based jurisdiction over facilities standing on or moored to the continental shelf of the United
States on the Convention on the Continental Shelf, without regard
to the pipeline or cable. The following testimonies of the Department of State were critical of this jurisdictional basis.
Statement by Morris D. Busby
Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
for Oceans and Fisheries Affairs
before the Subcommittee on Oceanography and the
Subcommittee on Merchant Marine of the House Committee
on Merchant Marine and Fisheries
Wednesday, February 27, 1980
It is a pleasure to appear before you today to testify in regard
to the Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion Act of 1980. In general,
Mr. Chairman, the Department of State has no objection to the development of ocean thermal energy conversion (OTEC). Indeed,
OTEC development is consistent with our foreign policy objectives
of reducing our dependence upon foreign sources of energy, and
130. S. 2492 and H.R. 6154, § 101(c)(7).
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promoting new energy technologies in an increasingly energy-short
world. However, my testimony today will be limited to a discussion of certain aspects of the bill of particular concern to the Department of State. I defer to the Department of Energy in regard to
the Administration's position on the overall appropriateness and
desirability of this particular bill at this particular time.
Mr. Chairman, Article 56 of the Informal Composite Negotiating Text (Rev. 1) under consideration in the Third United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea would establish the right of the
coastal nation to control the production of energy from the water,
currents and wind within a 200 nautical mile exclusive economic
zone off its coast, and would include jurisdiction over all OTEC
facilities and plantships within that zone. Under this text, the operation of OTEC facilities and plantships seaward of the 200-nautical
mile exclusive economic zone remains a freedom of the high seas to
be exercised with due consideration to the interests of other nations.
The United States has supported these provisions of the Informal
Composite Negotiating Text and looks forward to their inclusion in
an otherwise acceptable Law of the Sea Convention.
Although the LOS text would grant to coastal nations jurisdiction over OTEC facilities within a 200-nautical mile exclusive economic zone, under existing international law a coastal nation may
only exercise jurisdiction over OTEC facilities and plantships documented under its laws, and over all OTEC facilities and plantships
of any registry operating in its territorial sea.
Accordingly, at the present time there is no basis in international law to support the jurisdictional basis set forth in Section
2(a)(1) and subsequent sections of the bill. These sections would
provide that all OTEC facilities standing on or moored to the U.S.
continental shelf are subject to U.S. jurisdiction. However, Article
2 of the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf provides that the
coastal nation exercises over the continental shelf sovereign rights
only for the purposes of exploring it and exploiting its natural resources, which are defined as the mineral and other nonliving resources of the seabed and subsoil together with living organisms
belonging to sedentary species. This Convention and the other
1958 Law of the Sea Conventions are silent with regard to the exploitation of the non-living resources of the water column superjacent to the continental shelf. Therefore, the mere fact that an
OTEC facility operating under the flag of another nation is standing on or moored to our continental shelf is not in itself sufficient to
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establish United States jurisdiction under international law over
that facility. The United States firmly maintains that such activities
are a high seas freedom not subject to coastal state consent or jurisdiction.
However, under present international law the United States
may exercise jurisdiction over a cable or pipeline with the U.S. territorial sea used to convey electricity or products from an OTEC
facility operating seaward of the territorial sea. In this manner, jurisdiction could effectively be obtained over non-U.S.-registered
OTEC facilities operating seaward of the territorial sea even
though U.S. jurisdiction would not normally pertain to the OTEC
facility itself. In this context, I would note that it is unlikely that a
foreign-flag OTEC facility not designed to convey its products to
shore by means of a cable or pipeline would be constructed on or
moored to our continental shelf. It would generally be more advantageous for the operator of such a facility to locate it in an area
where the thermal resource is more favorable than adjacent to the
United States.
Sections 108(d)(1) and 108(d)(2) authorize the Secretary of the
department in which the Coast Guard is operating to designate
safety zones around OTEC facilities or plantships "[s]ubject to recognized principles of international law." The right of a coastal nation to designate safety zones around certain offshore installations
is granted in Article 5 of the Convention on the Continental Shelf,
but that right is clearly linked in the Convention to the coastal nation's right to explore the continental shelf and exploit its natural
resources. Because an OTEC facility or plantship would exploit the
thermal resource of the water column above the shelf rather than
the resources of the seabed or subsoil of the shelf, the status of a
safety zone about such a facility is therefore uncertain under international law.
It is worth noting how the drafters of the Deepwater Port Act
of 1974 handled the uncertain status under international law of
safety zones around a deepwater port. Section 19(c) of that act provides that "(e)xcept in a situation involving force majeure, a licensee of a deepwater port shall not permit a vessel, registered in or
flying the flag of a foreign state, to call at, or otherwise utilize a
deepwater port licensed under this Act unless (1) the foreign state
involved, by specific agreement with the United States, has agreed
to recognize the jurisdiction of the United States over the vessel and
its personnel, in accordance with the provisions of this Act, while
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the vessel is located within the safety zone . . ." Similar language
could be used to obtain jurisdiction over vessels calling at OTEC
facilities or plantships during their construction or to remove or deliver products, but not jurisdiction could be obtained over vessels
not making such calls, just as under the Deepwater Port Act jurisdiction could not be obtained over vessels not calling at the deepwater port.
[Paragraph Omitted]
Section 101(c)(8) of the bill would require an applicant for a
license to agree that no vessel will be used for the transportation to
the United States of things produced, processed, refined or manufactured at the OTEC facility or plantship unless such vessel is documented under the laws of the United States. We believe this
provision would hinder the ability of the United States to participate in the possible worldwide deployment of OTEC plantships.
For economic reasons it appears quite possible that OTEC plantships may be owned and operated by international consortia. The
provisions of this paragraph would lessen the attractiveness to international consortia of operating an OTEC plantship under U.S.
registry, and thereby potentially restrict entry of the U.S. OTEC
industry into aspects of the plantship market.
Similar discriminatory documentation requirements have appeared in legislation concerned with deep seabed hard mineral
mining. The Administration was strongly opposed to those discriminatory provisions, and I wish to emphasize the Administration's strong opposition to similar provisions in OTEC legislation.
In closing, I wish to note that the bill as presently drafted is
silent with regard to ocean thermal energy conversion facilities
within the United States territorial sea. Section 3(10) limits its definition of an ocean thermal energy conversion facility to any facility
which is "standing on or moored to the Continental Shelf of the
United States beyond its territorial sea. . ." This has the effect of
excluding U.S.-registered OTEC facilities located within the U.S.
territorial sea from the regulatory and financial aspects of Titles I
and II of the bill. The siting of an OTEC facility within our territorial sea is a possibility within some of our possessions and territories due to the proximity of the thermal resource to the shore. Any
non-U.S.-registered OTEC facility within our territorial sea would,
of course, be subject to U.S. jurisdiction.
[Paragraph Omitted].
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Statement by J. Brian Atwood
Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations
Department of State
before the Subcommittee on Oceanography and
the Subcommittee on Merchant Marine of the House Committee
on Merchant Marine and Fisheries
Wednesday, February 27, 1980
Dear Mr. Chairman:
The Secretary has asked me to reply to your letter of December 21, 1979, requesting our views on H.R. 6154, a bill to regulate
and promote ocean thermal energy conversion (OTEC) facilitates
and plantships.
We anticipate providing the Committee with a more detailed
explanation of our views under separate cover in the near future.
In the meantime, I would like to briefly summarize our most important points.
It is the opinion of the Department of State that there is no
basis in international law for the assertion by the United States of
regulatory jurisdiction over OTEC activities conducted by persons
not otherwise subject to United States jurisdiction. Section 2(a)(1)
refers to OTEC facilities standing on or moored to the continental
shelf of the United States. The mere fact that an OTEC facility is
standing on or moored to our continental shelf is not sufficient to
establish United States jurisdiction to regulate that OTEC facility.
An OTEC facility standing on or moored to the continental shelf is
not engaged in an activity exploiting the resources of the continental shelf, but is instead engaged in extracting energy from the water
column superjacent to the seabed of the continental shelf. As set
forth in the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf, the coastal
state exercises over the continental shelf sovereign rights for the
purposes of exploring it and exploiting its natural resources. The
natural resources of the continental shelf consist of the mineral and
other non-living resources of the seabed and subsoil together with
living organisms belonging to sedentary species.
Consistent with existing international law, the United States
may exercise jurisdiction over all OTEC facilities and plantships
documented under U.S. law, and over all OTEC facilities and
plantships of any registry operating in the U.S. territorial sea. In
addition, the United States may exercise jurisdiction over a cable or
pipeline within the U.S. territorial sea used to convey electricity or
product from an OTEC facility operating seaward of the territorial
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sea. In this manner, regulation could effectively be obtained over
non-U.S.-registered OTEC facilities operating seaward of the territorial sea even though U.S. jurisdiction would not pertain to the
OTEC facility itself. In this context it may be noted that it appears
unlikely that an OTEC facility, not subject to our jurisdiction,
designed to manufacture a product that would be conveyed to the
United States by means other than cable or pipeline would be constructed on or moored to our continental shelf. It would generally
be more advantageous for the operator of such a facility to locate it
elsewhere where the thermal resource is more favorable than that
adjacent to the United States.
We note that the Informal Composite Negotiating Text (Rev.
1) under consideration in the Third United Nations Conference on
the Law of the Sea would grant to the coastal state sovereign rights
within a 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone for the production of energy from the water, currents and wind. Under a treaty
concluded along the lines of that text, the coastal state would have
jurisdiction over all OTEC facilities and plantships within its exclusive economic zone. Under this text, the operation of OTEC facilities and plantships within its exclusive economic zone. Under this
text, the operation of OTEC facilities and plantships seaward of the
exclusive economic zone is a freedom of the high seas, and with due
consideration for the rights under the (future) Law of the Sea Convention concerning the exploration and exploitation of the mineral
resources of the seabed and subsoil beyond the limits of the continental shelf.
In addition, we note that the bill as presently drafted is silent
with regard to ocean thermal energy conversion facilities within the
United States territorial sea. Section 3(10) limits its definition of an
ocean thermal energy conversion facility to any facility which is
"standing on or moored to the Continental Shelf of the United
States beyond its territorial sea . . . ." This has the effect of excluding U.S.-registered OTEC facilities located within the U.S. territorial sea from the regulatory and financial aspects of Titles I and
II of the bill. The siting of an OTEC facility within some of our
possessions and territories due to the proximity of the thermal resource to the shore. Any non-U.S.-registered OTEC facility within
our territorial sea would, of course, be subject to U.S. jurisdiction.
We are concerned that the detail of the provisions of Title I of
the Act may be premature. Section 402 states that Title I will not
apply to OTEC facilities or plantships which the Secretary of En-

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1981

37

California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 11, No. 3 [1981], Art. 9
424

CALIFORNIA WESTERN

INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

Vol.

11

ergy has designated as a demonstration facility. A demonstration
OTEC facility or plantship is still several years away, and the first
few OTEC's to be built will most likely be for demonstration purposes. We are therefore concerned that the passage at this time of
detailed regulatory legislation may hinder the development of the
emerging OTEC technology, and may not be adequately predictive
of the true regulatory needs a few years hence.
[Remaining paragraphs omitted.]
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